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Introduction 
The rational relationship between ideol-
ogy and architecture is not a new concept 
within the framework of intellectual histo-
ries of violence. Yet, arguably, the contempo-
rary situation of post-modernity – of global 
flows, of capital led infrastructures, of falsely 
perceived post-political spaces – caters to 
a contemporary ignorance and thereby, a 
contemporary history of what architecture 
means and how architecture should be 
thought about within projects of post-failure 
environments. It is this new politic that this 
paper intends to theorize further as a ‘scrip-
ture’ to be acknowledged and strategically 
used in the intervention and production 
of human habitats that have experienced 
violence and extreme conflict. In addition, 
the paper uses the case of Rwanda to fur-
ther elaborate the presence of this so-called 
‘scripture,’ based on experience and con-
nected research literature. It contends that 
international conflict situates itself within 
the drama of ‘the urban’ and that the tangi-
ble deconstruction/ destruction of steel and 
concrete offers not just an opportunity for 
‘forensic investigation,’ as researchers like 
Eyal Weizman discusses, but also for an epis-
temological rethinking of post-experience: 
questions such as, what happens after? 
How can reconciliation encompass a tan-
gible, material, infrastructural component 
by retaining its democratic source? Can we 
design blueprints or conceptual response 
systems for development agendas that 
embody democratic design? 
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Post-conflict economy, rapid urbanization and the ever influential impact of global 
flows often drive very particular systems of post-conflict infrastructure, ignoring 
nuances of culture, politics and community. While a large number of analysts today 
contend that this is a growing symptom of the post-conflict economy, there has 
arguably always been a fundamental relationship between political articulation and 
architectural futures. The purpose of this paper is not to provide another plan-
ning parallax but to provoke the reader to reconsider habitat intervention within 
reconciliatory platforms and political developments today. Using the case of Kigali, 
Rwanda this paper seeks to pose both analytical and ethical questions. Firstly, can 
international development mediate with politics to engage with post-conflict habi-
tats, considering complex backgrounds? Secondly, how does this challenge conven-
tional thinking in planning and organization schemes that have largely driven habitat 
response and development in post-conflict spaces? 
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On Straight Lines and Architectural 
Subversion 
In his 1957 essay on ‘Urban Planning and 
Democracy,’ Lucius Burckhardt made a rather 
striking observation where he said, ‘For dic-
tatorship lurks behind any uniform plan: the 
seamless master plan is the outcome of a sin-
gle will. It can never come into being while 
real democracy is still at work’ (Fezer and 
Schmitz 2012). In its rather subtle irony, simi-
lar to his observation on how ‘the apartment 
meant to suit everyone actually suits no one,’ 
Burckhardt’s text expresses an interesting 
dichotomy (Fezer and Schmitz 2012). Firstly, 
that contemporary architecture’s obsession 
with straight lines, order and intolerance 
towards incident and/or eventuality creates 
an imposition of unwanted friction, often 
observed even within conventional plan-
ning methods. Decolonizing planning is yet 
another monolithic discourse, but the pri-
mary problem discussed is ‘informality,’ and 
that human spaces do take on human regen-
erations on how a space is used, negotiated, 
furnished, felt and politicized. Therefore, the 
first step towards solutions, as some recog-
nize, is to redact the definitional opportu-
nity of calling ‘informality’ a problem and 
taking it for what it is – a cognitive reality 
of essentially any human space. This is very 
much true of most visual experiences within 
the urban global south – elements involv-
ing images of markets, public spaces, ver-
nacularity (constantly contested), a jugaad 
of utility and most importantly, a certain 
aesthetic conceptual above all of the com-
mons.1 On a metaphorical note, perhaps one 
of the failures of grand Soviet design was its 
lack of open frugality, its inability to be open 
for participation, metaphorically speaking – 
‘that the grand conclave edges of structure 
were indifferent to the humanitarian needs 
for wooden flooring.’ 
What makes post-conflict infrastructure 
a controversial parallax is its subjugated 
confusion as a modern discipline in placing 
itself either as a practice of the ‘expert’ ver-
sus a community and/or place-led practice. 
Who rebuilds? What determines a rebuild? 
And whose politics articulate the rebuild of 
a destroyed space? What the development 
industry has arguably done over the past sev-
eral decades is influence the development 
of infrastructure as per a perceived episte-
mology of science, of method, structure and 
implementation that largely does not cater 
to plural and/or indigenous roots. Like ‘float-
ing parliaments’ in the Sloterdijkian sense, 
these benevolent models of intervention 
(/implementation) may not exactly shower 
upon the intervened (/host) ‘the intended 
consequence.’ The great canvas of models, 
anticipating political ‘monkey see – monkey 
do’ systems, hence is finally corrupted and 
speculation bound thanks to the complexity 
of diverse human societies and the inability 
of the agency of power in these cases to lis-
ten carefully and understand.2 The politics of 
architecture here is nested within the blue-
print of post-conflict strategy. The nature 
of global neoliberal capitalism today has 
preempted two fundamental cognitive view-
points. The first is that in post-conflict sce-
narios most governments and international 
agencies find themselves under considerable 
pressure (internally and externally) to partici-
pate in the global flows of the economy. The 
second is essentially that the reconciliatory 
process and the project of collective healing 
is often disconnected from economic growth, 
capital flows and structural investment agen-
das that, although impact the community in 
certain respects (ex: employment, industry), 
are unable to transform into emancipators 
of the post-conflict experience largely con-
quered by strategic/alternate/vernacular 
design. This dichotomy stands out as a unique 
case in political analysis as the parallax it sug-
gests is not an obvious point of engagement. 
To further expand, certain governments, for 
example, have taken up the neoliberal project 
from a strong representative direction, ena-
bling investment in façade creation and infra-
structure systems based on western models. 
This therefore emerges as the aspired attempt 
in integrating capital impact with the project 
of reconciliation/healing or at least as design 
rhetoric claims so otherwise. The impact this 
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has had on ‘space’ has been two-fold. Firstly, 
while this manages to produce small, isolated 
cases of infrastructure and glass aesthetic 
structures, it forgets the rest – the charac-
ters of the masses, the agrarian sector, etc., 
that dominate everyday life and livelihood. 
Secondly, it enables an opportunity of spec-
ulative forgetting or in some cases, politi-
cal erasure. To expand this with a Derridian 
description, the ‘wolf’ takes on the subversive 
form of creating an environment in which 
the ‘reconciliatory’ process is frozen as an 
excuse to the agenda of neoliberal growth – 
the silent nature in which it happens enjoys 
a ‘status-quo’ benefit of the so called ‘global 
consensus.’3 While it arguably increases 
economic inequality, the political economy 
project of architectural design and develop-
ment empowers a ‘particular’ grand façade: 
For whose pleasure? For whose benefit? For 
whose emancipation? For whose utility? 
On Transitions, Impatience  
and Ideology
When discussing wartime experiences in 
Germany in his book, On the natural history 
of destruction, W.G. Sebald comments: 
. . . as Heinrich Boll acknowledged, 
with “what we found when we came 
home,” proves on closer inspection 
to be an instrument already tuned to 
individual and collective amnesia, and 
probably influenced by preconscious 
self-censorship – a means of obscur-
ing a world that could no longer be 
presented in comprehensible terms. 
There was a tacit agreement, equally 
binding on everyone, that the true 
state of material and moral ruin in 
which the country found itself was 
not to be described. The darkest 
aspects of the final act of destruction, 
as experienced by the great majority 
of the German population remained 
under a kind of taboo like a shame-
ful family secret, a secret that perhaps 
could not even be privately acknowl-
edged (Sebald 2004).
What comes from much of Sebald’s texts 
on this matter is the behavioral mystery 
of post-war, recycled spatial production. 
‘Recycled’ in the sense that space appears 
to feel and look like the way it was before 
the war, even after it is reconstructed after 
the war. Even through the several conscious 
changes that the rebuilding process took 
into  consideration, the grand product of this 
re-construction was an intricate practice that 
was able to develop something in correla-
tion with the collective forgetting, amnesia, 
aspiration and mood of the people reflecting 
not just of what society wanted to become 
(and get over) but also keep quietly nested, 
the quaint aesthetic of what they had come 
to know as their city. To contest if this was a 
project of memory or a project of forgetting 
would be an unfair price for debate, as what 
people manufacture after destruction is 
often arguably facilitated by a complex con-
coction, an ironical mixture of what makes 
us human. Most importantly, though, – what 
directs this politics, who directs this politics 
and what, therefore, determines a visually 
tangible result can be disastrously different 
from each other – acknowledging the vio-
lence, chaos, silence, energy and cohesion in 
its reproductive nature. 
In a very interesting study on Turbo 
Urbanism in post-conflict Prishtina (Kosovo), 
Kai Vöckler is in conversation with Visar Geci 
where he asks, ‘. . .Can you briefly describe 
who works with whom and how a piece of 
land is developed? Is there a plan?’ and in his 
response on ‘plans’ he notes: 
Frequently, the decisions are made by 
the subcontractors, since they have 
the most experience. I call this “LAST-
MINUTE-INSPIRATION planning.” The 
roof is built when the money runs 
out. But envy also plays a big role. . . 
my neighbor has a building with seven 
floors, so I’ll build one with nine, and I’ll 
have more than he does! I don’t under-
stand that. . . Psychologists should do a 
study in order to understand what’s 
going on here in Prishtina. As far as 
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quality is concerned. . . . . . .well, there’s 
no need to wonder, since there are no 
rules and no state regulation. Everyone 
tries spending as little money as 
 possible. . . (Vöckler 2009). 
Visar here captures an important point of 
how chaos from the level of the individual 
to the level of the governance system relies 
on fragile dynamic fluidity – it is clearly 
never constant, the result of which is a 
confused post-transitional experience. The 
‘Turbo Urbanism’ Vöckler (in association 
with Archis Interventions) is studying con-
siders a combination of factors such as rapid 
migration, expat capital, lack of legal and 
policy frameworks, multiple layover stake-
holders, inbuilt corruption, sovereign-like 
autonomous agencies with temporal author-
ity, capital behavior, etc., and thereby turbo 
architecture and turbo urbanism. This exam-
ple of architectural behavior displays a cha-
otic, yet arguably stable, phase of which will 
predictably generate some temporal order in 
the future, the processes of which still stand 
unfamiliar. Unlike Sebald’s description of the 
post-war German experience, we observe a 
fundamentally different way by which capi-
tal perceptibly operates in ‘space.’ The image 
of cohesive reconstruction led by the collec-
tive and the image of turbo capital-led post-
conflict urbanism are strikingly different. 
The reason this juxtaposition is as a critical 
moment in the development of a theory is 
because, beyond the factual consideration 
of whether it is a democratic project or not, 
it visually turns out as a direct reference of 
the relationship between power, capital and 
space, variables that, when combined with 
capital phenomena and social behavior/
culture, produce two different spatial results 
with one similar theoretical answer: ideology 
produces architecture. 
While the link between ideology and 
architecture is not a fresh philosophical 
concoction, the transformative apparatus 
that ideology re-articulates in the mecha-
nism of post-conflict experience deserves 
a renewed lens. The reason I argue so is 
because the capital conditions, the nature 
of conflict, the conceptual dilemmas in the 
infrastructural-social parallax are fast chang-
ing and relatively new, and thereby have little 
to compare themselves to, especially in this 
particular context, with the past. Consider 
the constant flux of violent design embodied 
in political architecture where the condition 
of conflict is neither past nor future, but a 
fluid ever-changing present – the presence 
of which indicates the ‘flux,’ a period of 
time that never seems to end. This is often 
the case with protracted conflict, intracta-
ble disputes, wars that expand and retract, 
destruction that is transposed and shuttled – 
where the degree and category of the ‘post’ is 
never apt for definition. As ‘contested lands’ 
these spaces experience constant contesta-
tion in the form of violence, decay, migra-
tion, attrition, destruction, re-categorization, 
expressive restriction and most importantly, 
an unsettled spatial context that extends 
human suffering to a wider degree of both 
time and consequential inability/pain. As 
in ‘Hollow Land,’ Weizman talks about how 
‘the crime was undertaken by architects and 
planners in the way they drafted their lines 
in development plans. The proof was in 
the drawings’ (Weizman 2007). Weizman’s 
work talks about the role of architecture in 
political repression and how architecture 
becomes both a tool of strategy and testi-
mony at the same time. Is not architecture 
therefore, as Weizman’s work extends upon, 
an opportunity to find out what really hap-
pened? This poses a range of new questions 
for post- conflict infrastructural research. 
What is the role of architectural evidence, its 
produced testimony, memory in the facili-
tation of reconciliation? Can there ever be 
one and should there ever be one? How can 
we think of reverse engineering or decon-
structing architectural production from 
a post-development perspective in order 
to trigger democratic spatial production? 
Or do we have to rely on the visionaries of 
state and capital to show the way forward in 
this regard? While Weizman’s work is based 
on the Israel/Palestine issue, I think the 
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recognition of architecture as a tool of the 
political master both in a pre-conflict and 
in-conflict perspective premise is critical in 
building toward credible concepts of what 
happens after. To theorize this further, one 
will have to clarify that while infrastructure 
can embody an architectural agenda, ‘infra-
structure’ can remain exclusively away from 
an architectural politic. This is why rethink-
ing an architectural epistemology is critical 
in order to avoid the thoughtless sanitization 
of infrastructural directives. 
Can We Imagine Alternatives? 
The neoliberal seduction, its disruptive force 
in the imagination, as markers of ‘develop-
ment’ is not an easy force to talk about in its 
disruptive sense. To consider neoliberal archi-
tecture as an emancipator of post- experience 
is to consider a cognitive attachment with 
contemporary capitalism itself. The use of 
indigenous practice, local material, humility 
aesthetics, ecology friendly, low cost, dignity 
oriented planning does not have to be a bad 
idea. In the 2013 Annual Symposiyum on 
Architectural Research in Finland, I argued 
that we need to (re)locate architecture to its 
humble placement – design that is ‘low cost, 
equitable and comprehends with the locality 
with a pleasing aesthetic’ (Bhat 2013). Laurie 
Baker’s work has largely been a phenomenal 
reflection of what I mean by a ‘humble place-
ment’ in this context. Baker recognized that 
architecture is never permanent. He recog-
nized the possibility of designing dignified 
spaces using local, indigenous practice and 
material open to innovations, such as strate-
gic bricklaying methods that allow for cool-
ing (in tropical conditions) and other tweaks 
in design that don’t necessarily cost a lot of 
money but empower the consumer of that 
space with an experience that uplifts (Bhat 
2013). Baker built thousands of homes and 
buildings in India including some of finest 
‘slum’ rehabilitation projects India has ever 
seen. The other element of Baker’s produc-
tion process, the reason of which I brought 
his example here, is the ability to recycle and 
reproduce these designs as openly democratic 
possibilities – processes that don’t need an 
‘expert.’ The typology of most mainstream 
humble low income architectural landscapes 
today calls for such ideological and practice 
centric emancipators that help communities 
re-designate the condition and living aes-
thetic of their urban realities. So perhaps a 
valuable line of inquiry in the habitats disci-
pline is to think of ‘via architecture’ in terms 
of design specific emancipators that are most 
importantly local and sustainable. The varia-
ble of what is local and sustainable will differ 
from context to context but the democratic 
rationale, access to knowledge and ability to 
practice are utilities, I argue, that the govern-
ment, community and partners in develop-
ment cannot ignore. 
So what kind of phenomena are we in 
favor of? I think the primary intention really 
is to counter hegemony in architectural pro-
duction after a post destruction form crisis. 
While Western phases of modernism, post-
modernism, etc., displayed via architecture 
are symbolic of economic, social and cultural 
experiences restricted to certain geogra-
phies and ideas, ideally, global development 
should not generate an obvious sanction of 
the ‘copy-paste’ reproductive process immune 
to thought, cultural participation and politi-
cal commons acceptability, elsewhere. While 
one can argue that this does not take place 
democratically all the time, does the responsi-
bility here also rests with the one in power? Is 
it with the state? The architect? The develop-
ment partner? Who else? That another knowl-
edge can be put into action and that ‘another 
knowledge’ is possible. The trouble in explor-
ing these ‘other knowledges’ of spatial pro-
duction in the context of a post-conflict 
experience is, however, based on who con-
trols power – and how that power sanctions 
or articulates the spatial expressive nature of 
its imagination and/or its disconnect with 
the same. On the other hand, the trouble is 
based on what kind of conflict the space has 
just experienced. It could even be transitional. 
From visualizing post-genocide futures, post-
displacement migrations, post-bombing sta-
bility and post-violence in all its multiplicities 
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could produce a very diverse basket of reali-
ties that will challenge and call for epistemo-
logical re-thinking, not just because we need 
to understand disasters and our responses 
better but also because we need to design a 
world beyond the conventional humanitarian 
parallax. To do so entertains open, humane, 
dignified and equity centric approaches in 
post-rupture thinking: what happens after 
the disaster? Life goes on but can architecture 
bring back some lost dignity? 
Contemplating Kigali 
Is there such a thing called an ‘African 
Architecture?’ Beyond the categorization 
of imaginations that situate themselves 
within the geography of the continent, I 
think the general description of an ‘African 
Architecture’ cannot offer reasonable ideas 
of what these categories can consist of. I am, 
however, willing to have a categorical view 
of restricted spaces, the one explored here 
being East African architecture, and to filter 
down further more; experiences within the 
Rwandan State and other possible humani-
tarian dynamisms in issues related to tempo-
rary habitats. Interestingly, this is a helpful 
ignorance that I think is actually required to 
progress ahead in epistemological thinking 
related to the ‘African cause.’ Why? Because 
the colonial experience by and large has 
been the defining force of state formation in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. In many cases, the pro-
ject of an African Architecture has therefore 
found itself in one of two categories: 1) the 
museum, where symbols and images of the 
traditional household and village are placed 
for historical record, and 2) the state or a pri-
vate actor of influence stepping on to take 
symbolic political empowerments via state-
ments of architecture. Everything else is 
space yet to be theorized. 
The Rwandan State has been praised by 
the international community for its achieve-
ments in reconciliation and stability and 
its open business environment since the 
1994 genocide. Research has consistently 
indicated the robust and effective nature of 
Rwandan state capacity (Jones 2012). The 
Gacaca process in Rwanda has been widely 
recognized as a success and holds possible 
lessons for international law in reference 
to reconciliation (Clark 2011). Rwanda has 
offered an unparalleled example as a pos-
sible model for post-conflict experiences, 
especially considering the deep and last-
ing trauma the genocide created. So the 
inquiry of an architectural question seems 
an ingenious one: why consider the mate-
rial relevance of physical urban strategy in 
Rwanda when the post-genocide agenda has 
largely been the primary focus of political 
effort? The reason I think Rwanda makes a 
great example of architectural utility both as 
source and function in ideological and rec-
onciliatory directives is because of what the 
leadership has structurally undertaken in its 
affairs with issues of land, space and habitat 
in its process of building new imaginations 
of the future. The judgment of a critique or 
of an appreciation is a project this paper does 
not primarily undertake. However, the inten-
tion of using the Rwandan example is to 
expand our understanding of how political 
futures impact material/civic/habitat design 
and acknowledge pathways of thinking of 
reconstruction connected with the nuances 
of ideology and the subversive interpretative 
lingua of ‘development’ after a conflict – in 
this case genocide. The notion also observes 
that the cause for the future often displaces 
and redacts history both by terming it in 
causation and by baselining the experience 
as a permanently avoidable circumstance. In 
the case of Rwanda, the vision takes on the 
lead for this perceived future, making it the 
emancipatory monarch of spatial outcomes. 
To start with land, the previous phases 
of ethnic violence in the 1960s and 70s 
had displaced and exiled a large number of 
Rwandans, resulting in shifted land owner-
ship. When the Rwanda Patriotic Front took 
Rwanda back into control, the government 
had to develop large scale policy action in the 
area of restructuring land ownership mod-
els, systems and social perspectives. Land 
issues have always been issues of conten-
tion and conflict within East African political 
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systemization. As primary baggage of colo-
nialism, political instability, ethnic division, 
resource clashes, etc., land issues have always 
called on for status quo reversals, negotia-
tions and ways to rethink how land can be 
made a meaningful tool in reconciliatory 
processes. The Imidugudu programme led by 
the Government of Rwanda was intended to 
cater to the thousands of refugees and exiled 
Rwandans returning back home. Catharine 
Newbury argues that the Imidugudu was an 
assignment in ‘high modernism,’ equipped 
to launch the state’s interest in socially 
engineering a ‘certain’ kind of society as a 
result (Newbury 2011). The kind of ‘villagi-
zation,’ or cluster-centric development, that 
Imidugudu saw, however, was not unique to 
Rwanda in any way. Julius Nyerere’s Ujamaa 
policy in Tanzania was also designed with 
similar processes of villagization in mind, 
inspired by the ‘collectives’ model, based out 
of central structures designed to effectively 
improve economic production (which how-
ever, did fail later on). To a certain degree, 
the Imidugudu process were also seen as 
land concessions taking into account a cer-
tain planned karmic reciprocity for loss that 
the exiled had experienced. The Imidugudu 
policy was certainly controversial in many 
circles, but to a great degree, supporters of 
the state viewed the process as a require-
ment in social reconfiguration in order to 
take initial steps of developing new imagina-
tions of the country that the state favored. 
On the issue of land disputes in the Eastern 
province, Chris Huggins comments, ‘land 
sharing –  essentially a form of uncompen-
sated expropriation – was implemented from 
1996 on when Tutsi refugees returned to the 
country. The land was simply divided equally 
between the two households (usually the 
Hutu secondary occupant and the return-
ing Tutsi original owner)’ (Huggins 2011). 
Overall, the nature of land re-development 
and habitat structuring has been critiqued as 
a strategic project. As Des Forges’s said, ‘the 
policy and laws appear to offer more secu-
rity for the prosperous and powerful, eagerly 
solicited for their capacity to invest, than for 
the majority of Rwandans who make a bare 
living from their plots’ (Huggins 2011). But 
on the other side, some have questioned 
the validity of specific western ‘rights based’ 
angles as inadequate in analyzing these pro-
cesses within a plural nature. Early systems of 
ownership of ubukonde and ikigingi involving 
the passing of land via lineage and royal dis-
tribution, respectively, essentially involved 
community and power centered relations of 
land affiliation and distribution (RISD 2013). 
While scholars do acknowledge the various 
changes these processes undertook both 
during and after the colonial experience – 
which, to a certain extent also manipulated 
these relations by altering power structures 
and by reconfiguring agricultural practice 
directed at the growing of crops such as 
 coffee – it is undisputed that land was always 
nevertheless a complex issue that was often 
at the center of conflict. Therefore, the pro-
cess of dispossession that took place during 
these often-contentious power reconfigu-
rations ‘augmented social cleavages within 
Rwanda that would later contribute to mass 
violence’ (RISD 2013). Therefore, is not the 
logic of social engineering within the per-
spective of land structuring policies actually 
a positive strategic necessity? At the most 
recent stage of a series of land reforms, the 
parliament passed the Organic Act of 2013, 
which clarifies the contemporary modality of 
land transfers, regulations and extra territory 
issues, including Special Economic Zones. 
Going through processes such as enabling 
land regularization, land titling, etc., Rwanda 
also recently implemented street names and 
signs in 2012 (Buchana 2012). Although a 
seemingly minor development, I think it is 
quite a symbolic and rather epistemic leap 
reflective in certain terms, the material 
politic of spatial change and representation 
that has taken place in Rwanda in recent 
years. In the year 2000, the Government of 
Rwanda adopted ‘Vision 2020’ gearing to 
make Rwanda a middle-income country. 
The Economic Development and Poverty 
Reduction Strategies (EPDRS 1/2) were 
put in place, backing the five pillars of the 
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vision: 1) good governance and a capable 
state, 2) human resource development and 
a knowledge based economy, 3) a private 
sector-led economy, 4) infrastructure devel-
opment, productive and market oriented 
agriculture and 5) regional and international 
economic integration (GoR 2000). Rwanda 
embarked on a design mission of configuring 
its ministerial agendas on achieving some of 
these broader objectives. 
As the vocabulary of ‘economic growth’ 
found itself adopted within the ministe-
rial frame, a series of reforms emerged. One 
of them, for example, was the multilayer 
integration of almost half a dozen ministe-
rial agendas into one service-providing arm 
called the Rwanda Development Board. 
Within the interest of improving investment, 
developing businesses and realizing strate-
gic obstacles, such as distance to port and 
large-scale industry, the leadership decided 
to take the Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT) agenda seriously. Having 
realized a leading American engineering 
university to set up campus in Kigali, a spe-
cial economic zone for IT, liberalized the 
telecommunications sector, installed the 
country’s first fiber optic broadband network 
etc., generated a series of consequence of a 
far reaching aesthetic production. With the 
2010 Surbana masterplan of 132sq km of 
Kigali, Kagame’s imagination of visualizing an 
‘African Singapore’ went one step ahead.4 Any 
review of the new Kigali plan would appreci-
ate the forensic nature of detail and foresight 
the plan indicates. The plan is an ambitious 
one and calls for an extensive overhaul of 
resources towards infrastructure and other 
urban elements, apparently designed for an 
imagined socio-economic result. The nature 
of the project visually and aesthetically is 
unquestionably neoliberal – ‘capitalism with 
Asian values’ as Zizek would perhaps call it, 
though of-course adapted to the Rwandan 
context here. The completed phase of the 
Gacuriro Vision 2020 Estates, seemingly 
zonal, modular, reproductive as spatial prod-
ucts, replicate a ‘European’ aesthetic of a 
typical house: replicas of each other scattered 
mathematically over a hill.5 Other extensions 
nearby have been built by Chinese contrac-
tors and Chinese workers. The Kigali master-
plan zonal implementation, having already 
begun, has led to a process of resettlement 
for a large population living in the center of 
the city to other pre-built government pro-
vided households in the peripheries. 
It is indeed uncertain what the final out-
come of the masterplan will be. The manager 
of one of Kigali’s supermarkets once joked, 
‘We essentially are all serving the exact same 
number of customers, even though we have 
a new Nakumatt in town now. The group 
that shops at supermarket A on Monday, 
comes down to B on Wednesday and C on 
Saturday – there is a new supermarket in 
town but we don’t have new customers.’6 
This remark, although potentially biased, 
may not necessarily be completely off mark. 
While urbanization is inevitably happening, 
the question remains – how will the majority 
access the benefits or be empowered in time 
to be a part of this infrastructural progress? 
It requires a robust ecosystem of elements to 
generate, say an ICT economy. Rwanda still 
has generations to shift into the higher edu-
cation paradigm, not to mention its connec-
tivity with global innovation and economy. 
Let me for a moment, take a metaphorical 
leeway: Immanuel the farmer comes to town. 
Immanuel basks in the glory of Kigali tower, 
he even smiles at the visual leap Kigali has 
made – he is, however, unable to access any 
of the benefits of the products and services 
that glare all around him. After all, like the 
majority of Rwandans, he lives on merely a 
few thousand francs every month. The two 
realities: on the one hand, a political vision 
of the future and on the other, a ground real-
ity of the human condition, perhaps don’t 
match. This brings us back to our primary 
fundamental endeavor in thinking about 
post-conflict architecture – what does it sing, 
and to whom does it sing? 
While Rwanda has had to take tough deci-
sions in the name of post-genocide national 
stability and has made arguably loud and 
courageous articulations for the future, how 
Bhat: Via Architecture Art. 25, page 9 of 10
real are they within an inclusive reality? 
Even acknowledging the systemic nature of 
inequality, how can two parallel develop-
ments meet in the middle when the gap 
between them is so wide? I would argue 
that the Rwandan experience stands as a 
bi-polar parallax in theorizing post-conflict 
decision making from an architectural per-
spective. With a large segment of Kigali’s 
houses – temporary in nature, roofed with 
corrugated iron sheets, cardboard sheeting, 
local tiles and gravel paths to walk on – how 
far is the cognitive distance to a space that is 
built of steel, glass, concrete, marble, tarred 
and pebbled pathways, that is in terms with, 
‘Singaporean,’ ideas of space? What is the 
political economy connection going to look 
like? There is a need to think of epistemology 
in post-conflict design that is far more con-
nected to the socio-economic and cultural 
reality of a place. 
Conclusion
To conclude, the intention of framing these 
episodes of description and analysis is to 
most importantly put into writing the many 
contrasts, conflicts and comic speculations 
that often counterintuitively find them-
selves amongst each other as subjective 
elements. How does one theorize this com-
plexity? It is perhaps only in Badiou’s defini-
tion of philosophy that this enactment can 
truly open entry. For Badiou, a ‘philosophi-
cal situation is an encounter. It is an encoun-
ter between essentially foreign terms,’ or 
arguably seemingly foreign terms (Badiou 
2006). Politics and Architecture here are 
those seemingly foreign terms and it is in 
entertaining these complex yet necessary 
connections that meaning is often made. 
While this paper poses a range of critical 
questions, it also poses into limited valida-
tion the aspect of ‘performance’ that is often 
ignored as a category in the study of poli-
tics. The encounter in this context is there-
fore a meeting of politics and infrastructure 
that in several contemporary economic sys-
tems claim two separate sources. The claim 
of this piece is therefore to say that it is not 
true to disclaim politics and infrastructure 
as separate  commodities within the opera-
tion of development. The ‘discursive curve’ 
is in some ways representative of the vola-
tility of infrastructural intents. Architecture 
is part of the performance of politics and in 
Kigali, it is being used, to describe a differ-
ent kind of proclaimed  imagination – one 
that is both a consequence of global capi-
tal and is also an effort in developing new 
histories. 
Notes
 1 The term jugaad is a Hindi-Urdu term 
similar to the word ‘hack’ in English refer-
ring to ‘fixing up’ problems quickly and 
innovatively. 
 2 The ‘floating parliament’ is a political phi-
losophy joke based out of Sloterdijk’s work 
in his texts on ‘Bubbles.’ The joke entails a 
‘pneumatic parliament’ to be floated over 
post-conflict spaces that apparently installs 
‘democratic’ systems. 
 3 The notion of the ‘wolf’ is a complex phil-
osophical concept often extracted from 
Derrida’s work, however most prominently 
visible in his posthumous collections under 
Seminar 1 under Volume 1 of the Beast and 
the Sovereign published in November 2011 
by University of Chicago Press. 
 4 Detailed information of the Kigali mas-
terplan is available from Surbana, the 
Kigali City Council and the Government of 
Rwanda. 
 5 Note that the Kigali plans can be accessed 
from the Kigali City Council (kigalicity. 
gov.rw)
 6 From the personal experience of the 
author. Note that ‘Nakumatt’ is an East 
African chain of retail supermarkets.
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